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An Introduction to Destructive Coordination 
Mehrdad VAHABI1 
 
Introduction  
The concept of ‘mode of coordination’ captures the way in which the economy is embedded 
in a society. An analysis in terms of the prevailing modes of coordination may shed light on 
the particular institutional arrangement through which human activities are co-ordinated in a 
particular economy. In this vein, Polanyi (1944, [1957] 1968, pp. 148-49) has employed 
‘forms or patterns of integration’, Lindblom (1977) speaks of ‘control mechanisms,’ and 
Kornai (1984, 1992) refers to ‘modes of coordination’2i. All these authors conceive the 
economy as an ‘instituted process’ and emphasize the inseparability of politics and economics 
in “the analysis of basic social mechanisms and systems” (Lindblom, 1977, p. 8). 
Three main typical or ideal modes of coordination have been identified in the literature: 
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1) The Market mode of coordination refers to social organisation through exchange and 
markets. Polanyi (1944, [1957] 1968) and Lindblom (1977) coin this form of integration as 
‘exchange’ which requires a specific institution, namely a system of price-making markets.  
2) The Bureaucratic mode of coordination refers to social organisation through the 
authority of the government. This type of coordination is one of the variants of Polanyi's 
(1944, [1957] 1968) ‘redistribution’. It requires of some kind of religious or political centre, 
such as the state, that appropriates resources and then redistributes them. 
 
3) The Ethical mode of coordination refers to social organisation through ‘reciprocity’ 
(Polanyi, 1944, [1957] 1968). Polanyi’s use of the term, reciprocity relates to an overarching 
social pattern. In that, it differs from modern usage that refers to bi-lateral interaction. 
A typical or ideal model is of course an abstraction that selects a group of closely related 
elements from real world mixed systems. There is no real social system that can be 
exclusively coordinated by only one of these modes of coordination; rather, any given society 
may be analyzed in terms of a certain combination of these modes of coordination. However, 
the study of these known modes of coordination is not the focus of this paper.  
Our purpose is to introduce a further type of coordination: the ‘destructive mode of 
coordination’. It is social coordination through intimidation, threat and the use of non-
institutionalized coercive meansii. In this type of coordination, resources and human efforts 
are allocated to appropriate what other people produce. Strictly speaking, non-
institutionalized coercion refers to coercion unsupported by the law or the state. Yet in a 
broader sense, it also embraces coercion used by rival, contending parallel institutions. A 
“state of exception” as described by Agamben (2005) fits into this broader definition of non-
institutionalized coercion. It lends credence to the foundational role of organized violence that 
precedes the emergence of law. The term ‘destructive’ refers to conflictual and aggressive 
nature of a relationship that entails physical or moral destructioniii. Moreover, appropriation 
through piracy, confiscation, etc. connotes ownership of resources by disregarding, violating, 
annihilating, or excluding the property rights of others. Accordingly, the term ‘destructive’ 
also captures the establishment of the right to destroy or abusus as the ultimate boundary of 
property rights. This type of coordination has been almost entirely neglected in the 
mainstream economics, although some of its important aspects have been addressed by two 
particular strands of economic thought, namely the Public Choice School and the Rational 
Conflict Theory. A rapid overview of the literature is thus warranted in the first part to trace 
the theoretical background of our findings.  
In studying the destructive mode of coordination, it is useful to commence by considering 
simple illustrations.  Hence, in the  second part, destructive coordination will be discussed and 
compared with other types of coordination using two examples: traffic circles (roundabouts) 
and prisons. In the  third part, appropriation through pirating will be discussed as a further 
mechanism of destructive coordination. Biopiracy (blood patenting) will be first examined in 
order to clarify the relationships between destructive coordination and the institutionalisation 
of property rights. Then, we will tackle the question of rivalrous or complementary 
relationships between different modes of coordination and focus on disarticulation among 
them in the absence of a dominant mode. It will be argued that destructive coordination 
should be conceived as a mechanism that emerges in a transitional period marked by 
institutional vacuum. It may persist, but may also provide the soil where the other modes of 
coordination may take root. 
1. Theoretical background  
 
Destructive coordination as a form of social integration is about cooperating to coerce. The 
resource allocation in this type of coordination is appropriative and is based on predatory, 
grabbing or confiscatory activities. This type of coordination has been neglected in the 
mainstream economics for a long time, although “grabbing” activity as an allocation 
mechanism has received some attention in the Rational Conflict theory since the early fifties. 
In fact, Economic theory endeavoured first to integrate rational (and not real or “social”) 
conflicts as a source of appropriation. Haavelmo (1954) pioneered a canonical general 
equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive 
activities. The model was further developed, during the last four decades, in a variety of ways 
by game theoretical models of rational conflict (Boulding, 1962; Schelling, 1963), and 
different strands of new political economy (Hirshleifer, 2001) within a partial equilibrium 
framework. Their goal was to understand rational conflict which did not entail real 
destruction. Rational conflict refers to threat power and can be defined as a bargaining 
procedure without any real clash or conflict between the parties that are both partners and 
adversaries (such as negotiations on nuclear power, commercial negotiations within the 
GATT or WTO, and negotiations between institutionalized trade unions and employers’ 
organizations on wage and work conditions). A general review of these models of “rational” 
conflicts (Vahabi, 2004) shows that in equilibrium, they are “neutral” and have no effect on 
economic performance. In a sense, “rational” conflicts are similar to “money”, they disappear 
in equilibrium. 
 
 
 
A second version of conflict theory has been developed by the founders of the Public Choice 
School, notably by Bush (1972), Bush and Mayer (1974), Olson (1965, 1982) and Tullock 
(1972, 1974 a,b) in order to tackle genuine political violence. They have studied not only 
threat power but also real conflictual situations such as revolutions, wars, and terrorist 
activities. Their goal was to extend the Neo-Classical assumptions to other fields of social 
science such as politics. They thus endeavour to incorporate real conflicts in the Neo-
Classical analysis and provide a theoretical framework for a New Political Economy. Real 
conflicts are not neutral, and have a clear impact on economic performance, since they come 
within the scope of rent-seeking activities. 
The theoretical background of “cooperating to coerce” (Cowen and Sutter, 2007) should be 
sought in the theory of anarchy pioneered by Bush (1972), and introduced through two afore-
mentioned edited volumes of Tullock (1972, 1974 a). Two recent relevant edited volumes of 
Stringham (2005, 2007) which include a republication of some seminal papers in this field are 
valuable additions to this trend of thought. Unless anarchy is understood as chaos and 
mayhem, it can be conceived of a society without a state but not without rules (Coyne, 2005). 
The main issue is then whether an “ordered anarchy” (i.e. a social order without a state) is 
possible. Although earlier criticisms of anarchy (Tullock, 1972, 1974 a; Nozick, 1974) are 
almost unanimous that government is at least inevitable even if unnecessary, many libertarian 
anarchists suggest other alternatives. As Moss (1974) correctly underlines, an “ordered 
anarchy” entails not only a pure market economy but also a stateless communistic society. 
Rothbard (1973, 1977) and many other free market economists are advocates of a recent 
version of “private-property” anarchism. Polanyi (1944), Leeson and Stringham (2007) 
provide examples of archaic stateless societies based on “reciprocity” or primitive 
communism. The importance of these two major forms of “ordered anarchy” notwithstanding, 
my contribution consists of developing an analysis of a third type of “ordered anarchy” which 
I name destructive coordination. In this case, the state failure or sovereignty crisis is more 
important than a lack of state. Parallel institutions and contradictory orders (Vahabi 2006 a,b) 
may lead to an ordered anarchy where aggressive behaviour and the use of coercive means 
constitute the “rule of the game”. The focus of Public Choice literature is not such kind of 
“ordered anarchy”, and a few contributions that deal with the problem of “cooperation to 
coerce” result in the reemergence of government (Tullock, [1972] 2005; Gunning, [1972] 
2005; Hogarty, 2005; Cowen and Sutter, 2007;  Rutten, 2007; Holcombe, 2007). More 
importantly, in exceptional cases where such kind of order is considered to be viable 
(Friedman, 2007), state monopoly is opposed to a market private system of “multiple police”. 
In other words, “ordered anarchy” in the framework of Public Choice School is reduced to a 
pure market system that may also include (or exclude) coercion. Our contention is that 
destructive coordination should not be confused with market, bureaucratic or ethical 
coordination. 
In the following parts, we will first study destructive coordination as a particular form of 
social integration through two simple illustrations. Then we will focus on the economic 
dimension of this coordination as an appropriative allocation mechanism.  
 
2. Destructive coordination: two simple illustrations 
A simple illustration of destructive coordination in comparison with other modes of 
coordination is provided by the way car drivers may coordinate with each other in traffic 
circles.  
2-1. Traffic circles 
Different modes of coordination allocate the right to use the road in different manners. Market 
coordination: special tolls may be set to obtain the permission to drive in districts leading to 
such traffic circles during the day (Teheran’s ‘traffic project’ started in 1992 is a good 
example). Bureaucratic coordination: several traffic lights are installed on the circle to 
monitor and enforce the priority of drivers according to official prescriptions (Place d’Italie in 
Paris is a salient example). Ethical coordination: the voluntary attention and compliance of 
drivers towards other drivers renders such coordination possible (the state of social 
brotherhood during the 1979 revolution in Iran contributed to such instances of coordination 
even in the absence of police monitoring and official prescriptions). Destructive coordination: 
some drivers adopt an aggressive way of driving (by rushing into others and ‘pushing’ them 
out of way, honking, and nipping in and out of traffic) to force others to give them the lead. In 
such cases, they wilfully infringe upon the rights of others or ‘impose’ their proper rights 
which otherwise would be violated despite the fact that there exists a ‘code’ which clearly 
defines the rules and priorities. 
It is noteworthy that in a destructive coordination, even the drivers who have the priority must 
behave aggressively to impose their rights. Hence, to drive aggressively is not just an attitude 
chosen by ‘bad’ drivers who do not have the priority. Every driver, irrespective of being ‘bad’ 
or ‘good’ should adopt an aggressive behaviour to guarantee his/her rights or to infringe the 
rights of others.   
Aggressive driving increases the probability of accidents. However, borrowing the 
terminology of the ‘incomplete contract’ literature (Hart, 1995), the problem is that although 
the offence of the transgressor is ‘observable’, it  cannot easily be ‘verified’ by the third party 
(i.e. the insurer or the court) given the multiple entry/exit situation in a complex traffic circle 
such as Place Charles de Gaulle in Paris. If both parties are insured, if there is no severe 
corporal damage, and if the accident is not so costly as to require a detailed damage survey 
that may identify the offender, the insurance companies may apply systematically the rule of 
50/50 to share the damage costs of the accident due to the non verifiability problem. The 
systematic application of the 50/50 rule may encourage aggressive driving. Suppose that there 
are two types of drivers: aggressive and non aggressive. If the probability of an accident is θ, 
then the benefit of an aggressive driver who can overtake others, and shorten his waiting time 
in the traffic circle, in terms of the price of time saved would be B (1 – θ), and the cost in 
terms of time spent in the traffic and the car insurance surcharge would be C θ.  
 
The net benefit of an aggressive strategy, then would be: B (1 – θ) - C θ, whereas a non 
aggressive driver will save C θ if there is no accident. The real issue is thus to shorten the 
waiting time in a traffic circle and “grab” the price of time saved by adopting an aggressive 
behaviour. The game between these two categories of drivers is a special case of the ‘Chicken 
or Hawk-Dove game’ of Maynard Smith (1982)iv. It is a non cooperative and non repeated 
game, with no dominant equilibrium strategy if it is played simultaneously. A simple 
illustration of the game with the following matrix of pay-offs between two players A1 and A2 
with two possible pure strategies, namely A (aggressive strategy) and P (pacifist strategy) 
clarifies the point. 
Figure 1. Traffic circle game 
                                                                         Player A1 
Strategy A P 
A -1, -1 4, 0 
 
               Player A2 P 0, 4 1, 1 
 
Mainstream game theory would distinguish three Nash equilibria here: (Aggressive, Pacifist), 
(Pacifist, Aggressive) and a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where each player plays 
aggressively with a probability of 1/3 (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, p. 198). (4, 0) 
and (0, 4) are two pure strategy Nash equilibriav, but they have the defect of asymmetry. How 
can the players know which equilibrium is the one that will be played out? Even if they could 
have communicated before the game started, it would not be clear how they could obtain an 
asymmetrical result. The game contains a mixture of conflict and cooperation. Both parties 
will benefit if they can avoid simultaneous aggressive behaviour (with -1, -1 pay-offs), so 
there are benefits from some sort of cooperation. On the other hand, there are also conflictual 
interests because depending on how the conflict is avoided, the benefits of cooperation will be 
differently distributed between the two players. If for example, the conflict is avoided because 
A2 adopts a ‘pacifist’ strategy while A1 chooses an ‘aggressive’ strategy, then A1 will have 4 
benefits and A2 zero and vice-versa. The game is accordingly called anti-coordination. This 
well-known game provides a good illustration for disorder or anarchy. But under what 
conditions could we have an “ordered anarchy”? Inspired by the Anarchy Research Program 
of the Public Choice, Osborne (2005) argues that individuals can adopt a strategy known as 
“contingent cooperation”. Osborne’s model postulates that even in one-shot games, 
individuals can communicate before interacting, thereby enabling them to detect signals about 
the likelihood that the other party will cooperate. Undoubtedly, the problem of multiple 
equilibria in anti-coordination game will be solved if the players play sequentially. Every 
player has an advantage to move first, since the first mover can adopt an aggressive strategy 
and force the other to adopt a pacifist strategy (4, 0; or 0, 4) so that a situation of (-1, -1) be 
avoided. Plainly, it implies that drivers entering in a traffic circle from the right hand side (in 
the case of a right hand side priority rule which exists in most countries like France) should 
choose an aggressive strategy to ‘impose’ their rights. This result holds true for every 
incumbent driver who has the possibility to move first. Drawing upon this basic textbook 
game, I would like to emphasize the conditions under which even a one-shot anti-
coordination game finds its equilibrium solutions. Put differently, our endeavor is to show 
how coercion and aggressive behavior can lead to a particular order or to an “ordered 
anarchy”. 
Note that this type of coordination is at work due to the third party failure (the insurance 
company or the court) to implement the rules. For example, when the insurance companies 
are not legally bound to reimburse the insured in a short period after the accident, they are not 
motivated to incur the additional costs of a detailed damage survey necessary to identify the 
driver at fault. In France, the Badinter Law and Conventions decreed in July 1985 (Chabas, 
1995) radically modified the situation by binding insurance companies to reimburse the 
victims of car accidents within a six-month period delay. A more detailed investigation by 
insurance companies in case of serious car accidents limits the adoption of aggressive strategy 
and weakens destructive coordination. Thus the law provides a credible commitment to 
protect ‘good’ or pacifist drivers against aggressive drivers by having insurance companies 
that can reprimand them through monetary sanctions.  
The traffic circle example casts light on destructive coordination in a one shot or non repeated 
case. Our second example illustrates the logic of destructive coordination in a repeated game. 
 2-2. Prison 
Different modes of coordination can be distinguished in different types of prisons. 
Bureaucratic coordination is common in military prisons for national soldiers and officers at 
faultvi. In this type of prison, the relationships among prisoners and between prisoners and 
guards are regulated by official prescriptions and strict administrative regulations. Ethical 
coordination usually prevails in political prisons under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. 
Political prisoners support and take care of each other especially the weaker ones (those who 
are ill or recently and severely tortured receive special treatment and attention from other 
prisoners in the cell). Prisoners act collectively to display their distinct identity as ‘political’ 
opponents of the regime and boost their morale against the prison authorities who 
continuously try to crush their resistance. Market coordination is used in case of affluent or 
renowned prisoners (for instance, Paris Hilton in her recent short captivity) in ordinary or 
criminal prisons who can bargain special treatment and protection with guardians against 
monetary reward. Privatisation of prisons or their management can strengthen such kind of 
coordination. Destructive coordination is the dominant form of coordination in many criminal 
public prisons throughout the world. A more general philosophical reflection concerning the 
‘prison’ as the continuation of the medieval dungeon for ‘surveillance and punishment’ 
(Foucault, 1975; Deleuze, 1996) reveals the destructive nature of the institution in itselfvii. 
Putting human beings in a cage like animals (Netz, 2004) and destroying their vital space of 
life leads to adverse consequences such as: reproduction of criminal activities, high rate of 
suicide, mental disease, drug addiction, sexual assault, and sexually transmitted infections 
(STIs) (Coid et al., 2002; Stewart, 2007).  
These destructive dimensions of the prison as an institution notwithstanding, I refer to 
destructive coordination in a more specific way. It is based on the predominance of violence 
in the relationship between guards and prisoners as well as among prisoners themselvesviii. 
Accordingly, the ‘law of the jungle’ reigns among the various gangs of prisoners, particularly 
when governors and guards, far from protecting prisoners, mistreat them. While the practices 
employed in Guantanamo would have been illegal on US soil, they were authorized by an 
appeal to a ‘state of emergency’ (Agamben, 1998), yet the results of detailed investigations 
about prisons in the United States and France revealed that “every prison has its own 
Guantanamo” (Mouloud, 2006). Nevertheless, the ‘jungle’ has its own ‘codes and laws’, and 
one of its inviolable article is what we also find among the Mafia: “It is a fundamental rule for 
every man of honour never to report a theft or crime to the police” (Gambetta, 1993, p. 119). 
As Taylor (2003) reports regarding rape victims in English prisons, many suffer in silence 
because being labelled a ‘grass’ guarantees hostility or violence from other prisoners; and 
some may consider suicide to be the only option. 
An overcrowded and impoverished prison environment with severe sexual deprivation and 
frustration is a fertile soil for harsh territorial conflicts. Furthermore, a recent detailed study 
about the experience of imprisonment in various countries has found that the number of 
prison cells has increased, rather than decreased after major political changes such as the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc, the Apartheid system, or the Haiti dictatorship: “All international 
studies have clearly shown that the construction of new establishments, has increased, rather 
than diminished demand for incarceration” (Artières, Lascoumes and Salle, 2004, p. 35, my 
translation). In the absence of ‘public’ protection, aggressive behaviour permeates all the 
relationships among prisoners. Even when an inmate is confronted with an aggressive and, 
stronger prisoner, it is advisable to act aggressively and accept the cost of giving a ‘signal’ of 
not being a coward. Everyone will better seek ‘private’ protection by joining a ‘gang’-- and 
pay for it in terms of sexual intercourse, drug traffics, etc. Even if an inmate is not personally 
capable of reacting aggressively to aggression, his/her gang will respond in kind. Retaliation 
emerges, thus, as a way to regulate conflicts. Contrary to the traffic circle example, in a 
repeated game situation such as a criminal prison, having the initiative to move first is not 
sufficient to determine the equilibrium position, since retaliation is possible (Kreps, 1990). In 
this case, costly ‘signalling’ and creating the ‘reputation’ of being a ‘tough guy’ is a 
prerequisite of rendering one’s threat credible. The length of detention is a key factor for 
revealing the value of the ‘signal’ since those approaching the end of their sentence have a 
strong tendency to avoid conflicts. Furthermore, the type of crime for which the prisoner is 
detained and the number of incarcerations are other important criteria on which the hierarchy 
in the prison is established. “If a hierarchy exists in UK prisons, it may be linked to length of 
sentence (long and short term or remand), to the age (old and young) of the predominantly 
male population, and type of offence (sex, drugs, or violence-related). The older long-term or 
life prisoners (including sex offenders) are likely to have power and influence within the 
prison system, whereas the younger short-term or remand prisoners with drug problems or 
convicted of non violent offences are likely to be more vulnerable and compliant, especially 
those who are in the prison for the first time or who will be found innocent.” (Stewart, 2007, 
p. 53). 
Providing three “Cases in Anarchy”, Hogarthy (2005) discusses a prisoner-of-war camp 
(Andersonville) during the American Civil War. In his example, the prisoners do not act 
cooperatively, and are engaged in aggressive behaviour. He identifies an initial coalition of 
“raiders” and a second one of “regulators” who defend themselves against the raiders. The 
benefits of predatory or “grabbing” activity in the prison are once again a major issue for the 
raiders. Nevertheless, their pleasure is more than pure grabbing, but rather gaining a dominant 
position: “In the outer world, they had been insignificant, eternally existing in dread of 
discipline. Here the only discipline consisted of that which they administered” (Hogarthy, 
2005, p. 106). Of course, in Hogarthy’s illustration, the temporary domination of the raiders is 
overcome with the aid of the “pre-existing” provisional government. In the following 
discussion, I try to analyze a situation where an “ordered anarchy” can emerge in the presence 
of the state failure to guarantee public protection.  
The territorial conflict between prisoners in terms of game theory should be represented in an 
extensive form due to the dynamic character of the game. If A1 and A2 are respectively the 
stronger and the weaker prisoners, then their strategies (aggressive or pacifist) and the pay-
offs related to them are as follows: 
 
Figure 2. Territorial conflict in prison 
 
The upper number stands for the benefits of the stronger prisoner (A1), and the lower one 
represents the benefits of the weaker one (A2). If A1 adopts an aggressive strategy, A2 may 
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adopt either an aggressive strategy or a pacifist strategy. Although an aggressive strategy is 
costly for A2 (-8) compared to a pacifist strategy (0), A2 should adopt an aggressive strategy to 
give a ‘signal’ that he is ‘tough’. This will pay off in the long term, since A2’s credible 
commitment to retaliate persuades A1 to adopt a pacifist strategy if A1 anticipates that the 
outcome of a war of attrition will be mutually destructive. In such case, A2 will prefer to 
behave pacifically despite the fact that otherwise he will gain more (10 instead of zero), since 
he will be menaced by further retaliation of A1 that will cost him (-8) if he sticks to his 
reputation as ‘tough’. Signalling to build a ‘tough’ reputation will transform, step by step, the 
initial aggression/aggression situation with pay-offs (8, -8) to a final pacifist/pacifist situation 
with pay-offs (0, 0).  
All prisoners do not necessarily serve a life time sentence, and it is realistic to suppose that 
the dynamic game has a finite horizon with a last period of exit for the prisoners. Approaching 
the liberation date, prisoners have a strong stake to avoid conflict so that their detention will 
not be prolonged. The expected pay-offs of a mixed strategy of aggression and non aggression 
compared to a pure pacifist strategy can be formulated as follows: 
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(A) stands for an aggressive behaviour and (P) stands for a pacifist behaviour. (T) is the 
moment when the weaker party stops fighting and looses its reputation to reply tit for tat. If 
(α) denotes the signal of the initial combat, then in a two period game, the expected benefits 
of being aggressive would be 
 
α 8 + (1 – α) 10 > α 0 + (1 – α) 0, and thus α < 5  (3) 
 
It can be assumed that the probability of being aggressed (α) evolves with the length of 
detention. At the beginning of detention, the probability of aggression is at its maximum, 
since the newcomer is not part of a gang and his combat value is not tested. Then, given that 
prisoner as part of a gang or individually tries to build a reputation of a ‘tough guy’, he (or his 
gang) will respond to aggression with aggression even if it costs him (or his gang) highly. The 
reputation effect weakens the probability of aggression by the incumbent prisoners. 
Consequently, the probability of aggression will decrease up to a point where the date of 
liberation approaches. In this last period, the possibility of aggression will increase once again 
but not as high as the initial period, since the previous combats and the length of detention 
provides a signal that one cannot mess about with the ‘tough guy’ over a certain tolerance 
threshold. These three phases are illustrated in the following graphic. 
 
Figure 3. The probability of aggression and imprisonment 
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The peace between prisoners is then nothing but a ‘balance of terror’. The dynamic of this 
extensive game is not like the typical Rosenthal’s (1981) centipede gameix. It is a sequential 
equilibrium in which every player adopts his strategy on the basis of a belief he may have 
about the way the other player may behave with a certain probability. Thus, it includes the 
possibility that each player’s information set (for instance, A1’s) is out-of-equilibrium or off 
the play given the way the belief is formed. The possibility of choosing an out-of-equilibrium 
move by a player implies the fragility of equilibrium, and can be represented by a particular 
type of sequential game called ‘a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium’ (Kreps, 1990, section 
12.7). This type of sequential game captures the reputation effect. The depiction of the 
dynamic of the ‘balance of terror’ within the prison in terms of trembling-hand equilibrium 
highlights the fragile character of a non aggressive situation.  
Note that in this example, destructive coordination is closely linked to the nature of prison as 
a social institution that destroys the vital space of prisoners. Apart from this fundamental 
institutional failure, the lack of ‘public’ protection and the need for ‘private’ protection 
nurture destructive coordination. The perpetuation of this type of coordination is thus related 
to the institutional vacuum or sovereignty crisis within the prisons that justifies the existence 
of gangs and guarantees compliance to the ‘parallel’ codes of prisoners.  
 3. Destructive coordination and appropriation 
How are resources (goods and services) and human efforts allocated in destructive 
coordination compared to other types of coordination? This is, from an economic point of 
view, the thrust of the problem. To answer this question, Pareto’s distinction between two 
different ‘allocation mechanisms’x, namely the productive and the appropriative is useful: 
“The efforts of men are utilized in two different ways: they are directed to the production or 
transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by others” 
(Pareto, [1927] 1971, p. 341). Borrowing Pareto’s distinction, the allocation mechanism in a 
destructive coordination should be characterized as ‘appropriative’. Appropriation includes all 
the different types of predatory methods such as expropriation, confiscation, piracy, grabbing, 
etc.  
In the preceding two examples, we highlighted the importance of grabbing activity. 
Aggressive behavior in the traffic circle case guarantees the shortening of the waiting time or 
the grabbing of the price of time saved. In the prison example, raiders’ predatory activity is 
not only paid off by significant material benefits but also by gaining a dominant position. In 
both cases, social integration through coercion allocates resources in an appropriative way. 
Although pure economic or appropriative dimension of destructive coordination has been 
stressed in the previous examples, our focus was mainly on the specific social coordination as 
an “ordered anarchy”. Since property rights are part of the law and order package, an inquiry 
about the type of social order precedes the analysis of property rights and economic 
allocation. The latter shall now be developed. 
A simple illustration regarding the way destructive coordination allocates a given resource in 
comparison with other types of coordination will clarify this point. 
 3-1. Biopiracy: res nullius and privatization 
Consider the example of a ‘contested’ or an ‘invaluable good’ (Radin, 1996; Arrow, 1997), 
namely blood. Although the practice of blood transfusion started five hundred years ago, it 
was not until the twentieth century that blood became a widely-sold body ‘product’. Blood 
was the first human body ‘part’ to be commercialized. In fact, there are different allocation 
mechanisms in the case of blood. 
Ethical coordination: Richard Titmuss (1971) strongly advocated an entirely voluntary 
system for blood donations, excluding monetary rewards for the donors. In his opinion, blood 
should be a gift, not a commodity and the act of donation should confirm a citizen’s 
commitment to the principle of reciprocity. “Short of examining …the institution of slavery – 
of men and women as market commodities – blood as a living tissue may now constitute in 
Western societies one of the ultimate tests of where the ‘social’ begins and the ‘economic’ 
ends.” (Titmuss, 1971, p. 158). The United Kingdom system of supplying the blood for 
transfusion on the basis of a voluntary and unpaid collection was his model. This model was a 
reproduction of the first modern blood bank at Cook County Hospital in Chicago in 1927, 
invented by Oswald Hope Robertson, which was inspired by the experience of battlefield 
transfusion (Hess and Schmidt, 2000). 
Market coordination was introduced in 1955 and then legalized in the United States in 1966 
after a court ruling which ordered that blood was a product like any other. The dispute had 
started when two commercial blood banks in Kansas City, Missouri, had charged a non profit 
community blood bank with conspiracy “to hamper, restrict and restrain the sale and 
distribution of blood in interstate commerce” (Cited in Kimbrell, 1995, p. 134). It should be 
highlighted that the American system was not one of undiluted market coordination; rather it 
was a mixed system, comprising both commercial and non commercial blood banks, and 
utilizing various modes of payment. According to Titmuss’ estimates at the time, about one 
third of the U.S. supply came from paid blood donors, most of them poor, homeless, often 
alcoholics or drug addicts. In West Germany more than one third of the blood was coming 
from paid blood donors. In Japan virtually all the blood was distributed commercially because 
the giving of blood was shunned as an infringement of the personal sphere, and all blood was 
imported.  
Bureaucratic coordination: in this system the blood allocation is managed by the state, rather 
than by commercial blood banks. Here the donors were sometimes paid. Two salient but 
different examples are: i) the former USSR where approximately 50 percent of the blood 
collected this way, and donors fetched a high monetary reward; and ii) Sweden, where all  
blood was (and is) gathered and paid for by the state, rather than by commercial blood banks. 
An administrative coordination without any payment to the donor, and even without the 
donor’s consent has recently been made possible through a new definition of death. Following 
the recommendation of the Harvard Medical School committee in 1968, the American 
Medical Association, the American Bar Association, and a White House commission all 
endorsed, in 1981, that death was the moment when brain activity rather than heart and lung 
function stopped permanently. Within a short time, most states had passed legislation in the 
same vein. Given new technologies in artificial circulation and respiration, patients who were, 
according to this new definition, “dead” could be kept functioning for months, even years. 
These ‘neomorts’ or ‘living cadavers’ could then be used as ‘storage systems’ or 'research 
tools’ for testing drugs and new medical procedures, or for providing scarce organs and blood. 
Hospitals could allocate the organs from the ‘neomorts’ according to a waiting list to patients 
without payment. If such harvested organs or blood is provided for free, this would be an 
instance of bureaucratic or administrative allocation. If, on the other hand, harvesting was 
done without compensation, and the crop sold in the market for organs and blood, this would 
be destructive coordination. 
Count Dracula (Stoker, [1897] 1997) and vampires illustrate nicely a kind of destructive 
coordination of blood. The Transylvanian Count sucks ‘unpaid’ and ‘non-donated’ blood. His 
action is comparable to piracy or appropriation of blood. The same type of allocation can be 
found through harvesting the ‘dead’ in developed countries by tightened definition of death, 
or through biopiracy in under-developed countries. We have already mentioned the 
importance of a change in the definition of death. The appropriation of ‘neomorts’ blood 
without donors’ consent is related to the fact that there is no authority or defined property 
rights over a cadaver. We are confronted with a non property or res nullius situation. To 
rectify this institutional vacuum that provides the opportunity for appropriation, people in 
developed countries are informed that in the absence of a clear disapproval of organs donation 
during their life time, their cadaver may be used for clinical purposes.  
Biopiracy provides another instance for destructive coordination in blood allocation. The term 
‘biopiracy’ was coined in the early 1990s by Pat Mooney, Executive Director of ETC Group, 
a Canadian NGO formerly known as the Rural Advancement Foundation International 
(RAFI), “to cover the unauthorized and uncompensated expropriation of traditional 
knowledge. This includes the patenting of seeds and trees, healing herbs, and the selling of 
human body tissue.” (Tedlock, 2006, p. 257). Many other definitions and interpretations have 
been ascribed to the conceptxi (see Hamilton, 2006, p. 159) among which the one suggested 
by Shiva (2001) is particularly relevant. For it calls into question the legitimacy of 
‘intellectual property rights’ (IPR) as a way to ‘plunder’ rather than ‘protect’ biological 
resources and products that have been used over centuries in non-industrialized cultures. In 
fact, in 1994, the WTO developed a global patent system based on the US legal concept of 
intellectual property rights. Under this new legal regime, known as the Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), individuals and groups who claim to have 
‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ something are given a monopoly over the commercial development 
of their innovation over a limited time period (usually 20 years). Anything that is not 
protected by intellectual property rights is considered to be in “the public domain”. Many 
examples of biopiracy have been cited. The following are a few of the well known cases: the 
‘seed wars’ or the ‘international controversy over the ownership of germplasm and other 
related issues’ of the 1980s (Juma, 1989), the patenting of living organisms (Bright, 1994, 
Kimbrell, 1995), the W.R. Grace patent on a fungicide derived from the seeds of the Neem 
tree – Azadirachtin Indicaxii (Hamilton, 2006, pp. 164-168), the launch of a new strain of 
‘trailing’ Busy Lizzie by the multinational biotech giant Syngenta (Barnett, 2006), the 
possible extinction of the Rosewood tree and the production of Chanel No. 5 (Amazon News, 
2002). Biopiracy also includes blood patenting and several cases have been reported. 
The first case was reported in August 1993 by the RAFI regarding the US government’s 
attempt to patent a cell line derived from a 26-year-old Guyami woman (western Panama). 
The cell line, a type of culture that can be maintained indefinitely, came from a blood sample 
obtained by a researcher from the US National Institutes of Health in 1990. The application 
claimed that the cell might prove useful for the treatment of the Human T-lymphotropic virus, 
or HTLV, which is associated with a form of leukemia and a degenerative nerve disease. 
Despite the intervention of the President of the Guyami General Congress who asked the US 
to withdraw its claim and repatriate the cell, the GATT did not forbid the patenting of human 
material. Facing strong opposition by a growing number of NGOs, the US finally dropped its 
claim in November 1994 (Bright, 1994). But this was not the end of the story. In January 
1994, two similar cases were brought to light by a European researcher. The Swiss NGO 
activist Miges Baumann discovered that the US National Institutes of Health had filed 
‘invention’ applications on cell lines derived from the Hagahai peoplexiii and the Solomon 
Islanders. These cells might also be useful in curing HTLV. The story of this so-called 
‘invention’ of the Hagahai cell line could be traced back to the early 1990s when the Genetic 
Institute of the University of Javeriana in Colombia gathered tissue samples from hundreds of 
Columbian indigenous people and sent 2305 blood samples to the US National Institutes of 
Health. The US National Institutes of Health then patented the cell in March 1995. However, 
it abandoned the patent under the pressure of public outcry in late 1996. Of course, even today 
the Hagahai cell line is available to the scientific public for $290 per sample at the American 
Type Culture Collection (ATCC). Another case of biopiracy in August 1996 concerned the 
doctor accompanying a US research team in Brazil who asked hunters from the Karitiana tribe 
for samples of their blood under false pretexts. When questioned about the motivation for 
taking samples, the doctor denied any intention of commercializing the blood. However, later 
it was revealed that the blood was commercialized and sold $500 per sample on the internet 
by Coriell Cell Repositories, a not-for-profit scientific institution, in Camden, New Jersey 
(Tedlock, 2006, p. 257).  
 
Patenting blood, like other forms of biopiracy such as expropriation of traditional knowledge 
of indigenous people, patenting of seeds, healing herbs, and selling of human body tissue, 
institutionalizes private property through the abolition of property rights. The origin of 
private property is not frugality, ‘invention’ or free exchange, but appropriation through 
colonialism, pirating, and other violent means. This was true during the so-called ‘primitive 
accumulation of capital’ (Marx, [1867] 1978, Vol. 1, chapter 31), and it is also true in the age 
of mature capitalism. Private property should begin with a state of no property (res nullius)xiv 
as if one finds or ‘discovers’ something that has never been lostxv, or has never belonged to 
anyone so that it becomes ‘appropriable’. Patenting life and plants assumes such a state of 
‘free access’ or res nullius. As noted earlier, according to the TRIPS legislation, anything that 
is not protected by intellectual property rights is considered to be in the ‘public domain’, 
which means it can be exploited by anyone without any concern for the wishes of the original 
(knowledge) holders and without sharing any monetary or non-monetary rewards with them. 
The inclusion of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) into the text of the WTO agreements was a 
direct result of pressure from US industries dependent on IPR, not least of which were the 
pharmaceutical and agro-chemical companies (Correa, 2000). Bromley (1992) rightly notes 
that ‘public domain’ is not an appropriate concept for describing an ‘open access regime’ in 
which there is no property (res nullius). “The essence of any property regime is an authority 
system that can assure that the expectations of rights holders are met…When the authority 
system breaks down – for whatever reason – then common property (res communes) 
degenerates into open access (res nullius).” (Ibid., p. 12).  Open access results from the 
absence – or the breakdown – of an authority system whose very purpose is to assure 
compliance with a set of behavioral conditions with respect to the natural resources or human 
life. To address this problem, the TRIPS legislation requires each nation state to create 
patents for all life forms in its territory.  
Property is inseparable from sovereignty. The separation of property rights and sovereignty 
muddles the concept of property rights. The reason is that among different types of property 
rights, the one which cannot be contracted away is abusus, while both usus and fructus can be 
contracted without causing any damage to the very right of ownership. Thence the ultimate 
boundary of ownership is the right to destroy. Ownership also starts by the sovereign power 
that protects and hence could destroy. The institutionalisation of private property requires the 
exclusion or expropriation of others from the right to control. Blood patenting is a pre-
requisite of commercialising cell lines. Thus, destructive coordination of blood allocation 
through cell line patenting or dead ‘harvest’ is a transitional phase to build the necessary 
institutional arrangements for private property and market allocation. 
 3-2. Destructive coordination and disarticulation problem 
Social order is too complex to be represented by a single ‘idealized’ coordination mechanism. 
It is rather the outcome of a particular constellation of different modes of coordination. The 
rivalrous or complementary relationships, between different types of coordination is thus the 
major issue of every social order. To illustrate the point, Schlicht (1998)xvi cites Titmuss’ 
blood allocation example.  
Titmuss (1971) stresses the rival uses of exchange and gift in blood donation. Many persons 
donate blood voluntarily, but cease to do so if a commercialized system is introduced whereby 
donors receive money for their donation. But why is this so, asks Arrow (1972) in his paper 
about Titmuss’ book, and finds no answer to his question: “Why should it be that the creation 
of a market for blood would decrease the altruism embodied in giving blood? I do not find 
any clear answer in Titmuss.” (1972, p. 351). Arrow is more in favour of a ‘mixed system’ in 
blood allocation such as the type developed in the US, and maintains his position twenty five 
years later when he reviews Radin’s book (Arrow, 1997, p. 762). Schlicht, however, finds an 
answer to this question: “Without a blood market, the individual donor will donate out of 
moral obligation (‘If nobody donates, there would be no blood to help the injured’). With a 
market, this argument loses force, because the price mechanism now provides another means 
to secure blood supply (‘If there is insufficient blood supply, the price must be raised’). 
Without a market, blood donations appear indispensable. The introduction of a blood market 
creates an improved possibility for obtaining blood and thereby destroys the moral obligation 
to make donations. Duty is substituted by money in a lumpy way.” (Schlicht, 1998, p. 228).  
 
In Schlicht’s answer, the dilemma ‘gift versus exchange’ is explained in terms of an 
institutional arrangement (price mechanism) at work. If there is a market, then the price 
mechanism takes care of a shortage in ‘blood supply’ by raising the price level. Nevertheless, 
the price mechanism is not sufficient to resolve the problem of ‘quality’, since adverse 
selection due to asymmetrical information between buyers and sellers is present in the blood 
market. In fact, Titmuss (1971) emphasizes several types of failure with regard to the market 
allocation of blood among which the ‘bad’ quality of blood is noteworthy. The blood sold by 
paid donors is drawn almost exclusively from the neediest layers of the population including 
the sick, and addicts. Accordingly, a major risk of infection through transfusion becomes 
imminent. Hence, the market failure requires a complementary mechanism such as reputation 
or special regulation to guarantee the quality of blood collected by commercial blood banks. 
It is not surprising then that since the Federal Trade commission (FTC) decision in 1966 
concerning the classification of blood as a ‘commodity’, the use of paid donors for whole 
blood used in transfusions declined in the US “from about 80 per cent of all transfused blood 
in 1966 to less than one per cent in 1991, due to ethical concerns about buying and selling and 
in part to fears that blood from paid donors is a potential source of infection.” (Kimbrell, 
1995, p. 135).  
The ethical coordination of blood allocation is not exposed to the infection risk, since unpaid 
donations come from all layers of the population, and the voluntary nature of procurement 
precludes untruthfulness with regard to the quality of blood. But why, as Schlicht suggests, 
does an improvement in obtaining blood through market allocation destroy the moral 
obligation? The reason should be sought in the pervasiveness of market relationships. In the 
presence of commercialized blood, free blood donations also become ‘commodity’ to some 
extent, since it can be sold at market prices. One simple illustration is blood products. In 
1991, over 13 million plasma extraction procedures were performed in the US. Over 95 per 
cent of the donors were paid. Voluntary donor centres like the Red Cross provided another 
two million litres of plasma, collected for free from donors “but often sold at market prices in 
the plasma products market” (Kimbrell, Ibid.). But why should one provide a ‘gift’ that would 
be sold at market price? In other words, the reciprocity logic becomes subordinated to the 
market logic. The organic combination of different modes of coordination leads to the 
domination of one of them. The pervasiveness of the market coordination subordinates the 
logic of reciprocity by reducing its proportions and feasibility, and by destroying its particular 
institutional arrangement.  
At a psychological and cognitive level, Schlicht notes the importance of ‘the clarity 
principle’: “If there are several reasons for doing something, this creates ‘overjustification’; 
one possible motive will be selected, and all others will be discounted.” (Schlicht, 1998, p. 
228). This psychological explanation at an individual level should be completed by an 
institutional analysis at an aggregate level. The integrative effect of every type of 
coordination is conditioned by the presence of definite institutional arrangements, such as 
symmetrical organizations (reciprocity), central points (redistribution), and market systems 
(exchange). The articulation among different forms of coordination requires the domination of 
one of them due to the coherence of institutional arrangement that supports a particular type 
of coordination.  
But what happens in the case of an institutional vacuum? To continue with the example of 
blood allocation, what happens in the case of ‘blood patenting’? We find no answer to this 
question in Titmuss, Arrow, or Schlicht, since they do not discuss biopiracy. To address this 
problem, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) recognizes that genetic resources are 
nationally sovereign resources. When genetic resources become conceived of as ‘sovereign 
resources’, it becomes possible to see them as something other than ‘common heritage’ or in 
IPR terminology, as part of the ‘public domain’ from which we can all benefit for free. But as 
already mentioned, this means that the TRIPS legislation requires each nation state to create 
patents for all life forms found in its territory. Of course, one can imagine the implication of 
this legislation for many African countries which do not even have sufficient financial funds 
to hire lawyers or juridical experts to represent them in the WTO!  
As argued before, biopiracy is a form of destructive coordination that allocates resources and 
human efforts through appropriation. Destructive coordination is the emblematic type of 
coordination that usually prevails under conditions of institutional vacuum, as illustrated by 
the examples given in this paper. By ‘institutional vacuum’, we do not mean a situation 
devoid of institutions or amorphous institutions. It refers to a transitional period where the old 
institutions and organisations of coordination cease to function, but the requisite for new 
systems of coordinative institutions have still not been developed sufficiently. An institutional 
vacuum is generally linked to sovereignty crisis, or generalised parallel institutions where 
protection of one’s life and entitlements is often more important than production or 
transaction. It may be conceived as a state where the rules confined to pockets of 
Guantanamo's in some prisons govern an entire region or society. The post-revolutionary Iran 
has been witnessing the dominance of destructive coordination with Bonyads as its particular 
economic institution. This type of coordination at a macro level can be called ‘the Iranian 
Disease’, a pandemic more dangerous than ‘the Dutch Disease’ for economic growth (see 
Vahabi 2006a, b). Protection costs rather than transaction costs become accordingly the 
determining factor in the allocation of resources and human efforts.  
Bargaining, reciprocity, and third party intervention (state or some other form of central 
power) would then assume a secondary role compared to bi-party conflictual relationships. 
Appropriation is a transitional phase, giving rise to more tightly defined definite rights (not 
only property rights, also communal rights - the entire system of rights may crystallize). A 
transitional phase may not be necessarily ‘transitory’, or short. It may stretch over centuries as 
in the case of ‘primitive accumulation of capital’. Under such circumstances, there is no 
dominant mode of coordination. In this sense, we may even speak of disarticulation. 
However, disarticulation does not necessarily imply chaos. A special kind of order or 
“ordered anarchy” may be maintained through intimidation, threat, and aggressive means that 
prepare the way for new institutional arrangements and corresponding constellation of 
property rights.   
Conclusion 
Four results can be drawn from this study. The first is that besides market, bureaucratic and 
ethical coordination, there exists another type of coordination: destructive coordination. As 
my illustrations of traffic circles and prisons show, destructive coordination is supported by 
an institutional vacuum, and is regulated through intimidation, threat, and the adoption of 
aggressive attitudes or means. Two general conditions are required for the existence of 
destructive coordination: i) there should be a game that contains a mixture of conflict and 
cooperation, where adversaries should also behave as partners. In both examples, destructive 
coordination is not the outcome of a zero sum game; ii) there should be a third party failure 
(the state or the insurer), and hence a failure of external enforcement. In the traffic circles 
case, the non verifiability condition by the insurer or the state prompted the failure. In the 
prison case, the absence of public protection entailed destructive coordination. Yet an order or 
equilibrium was established through aggression (non institutionalised violence or coercion) 
that can be depicted as “ordered anarchy”.  
The second result is that the aggressive behaviour is not the result of the players’ wicked 
nature or motivation (good or evil). Players must necessarily adopt an aggressive behaviour-- 
not only in order to infringe upon the rights of others but also to impose their own rights on 
others or to build a reputation for toughness. To put it differently, aggressiveness as 
behavioural regularity is derived from the rules of the game (or institutional arrangement) in 
case of destructive coordination.  
 
The third result is that at an economic level, the proper allocation mechanism of destructive 
coordination is appropriation through piracy, confiscation, robbery, predation, etc. Destructive 
coordination is essential in the abolition as well as in the emergence of property rights due to 
its role in defining abusus. Private as well as state ownership assumes that property rights are 
institutionalized and are well defined so that the ultimate boundary of ownership, namely the 
right to destroy (abusus) is also legally clarified and enforced. But the primary role of 
destructive power in resource allocation implies extra legal, ambiguous, undefined, or non-
institutionalized (or insufficiently institutionalized) property rights. Booties in warfare and 
looting, or confiscated properties in a revolution are what may be called ‘indeterminate’ 
properties. The essence of any property regime is an authority system that can assure that the 
expectations of rights holders are met. When the authority system breaks down – for whatever 
reason – then common property (res communes) degenerates into open access (res nullius). 
Although they can be transformed into ‘public’, ‘personal’, ‘private’, ‘combinatorial’, or other 
types of property ownership, their initial status remains indeterminate. In ‘indeterminate’ 
properties, entitlements to property rights depend on the discretionary power of the coercive 
authority. The biopiracy example identifies the importance of destructive coordination as a 
transitional phase in the institutionalisation of definite property rights. Under destructive 
coordination, the question of sovereignty overwhelms the problem of property, and protection 
rather than production or transaction occupies the pride of place. This example highlights how 
destructive coordination (blood patenting) can transform into market coordination (blood 
commercialization) in the presence of the US liberal state and giant pharmaceutical 
multinationals.  
Finally, the analysis of the articulation among different types of coordination leads us to grasp 
the domination of one type of coordination over the others. However, the institutional vacuum 
that is marked by disarticulation among different modes of coordination provides a fertile soil 
for the preponderance role of destructive coordination.  
There are still several issues that require further investigation. For instance, if economic 
processes are regarded as a set of decision, information and motivation structures, then what 
are the peculiar features of these structures with regard to destructive coordination? The 
answer to this question should be the subject of future research. 
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i
  Despite the similarity of these classifications with regard to the importance of institutional 
arrangements in coordinating economic activities, their differences in several essential respects should not be 
dismissed. Some of these differences have been discussed in Kornai (1984, p. 309; 1992, p. 96).  
ii
  The movie “On the Waterfront” directed by Kazan nicely illustrates destructive coordination in the job 
market.  
iii
  For a more systematic analysis of ‘destructive power’ and its different forms including threat power 
and coercive means, see Vahabi, 2004. 
iv
  There are three basic types of games that have been extensively discussed in game theory, namely the 
Chicken or hawk-dove, coordination and the prisoners’ dilemma games (Rasmusen, 1992; Hargreaves Heap and 
Varoufakis, 1995). The Chicken or hawk-dove game is also known as the anti-coordination game (Binmore, 
1990). 
v
  We can calculate the probability of adopting each strategy in the mixed strategy equilibrium by players 
in our example. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, A2 must be indifferent between Pacifist (P) and Aggressive 
strategies (A). This requires that A1’s probability of Aggressive strategy, which we denote by ψ, be such that  
 pi (Pacifist) = (ψ) . (0) + (1 – ψ) . (1) = (ψ) . (-1) + (1 – ψ) . (4) = pi (Aggressive) 
 From this equation, we can conclude that 1 – ψ = 4 - 5 ψ, so ψ = 0,75. The Chicken game discussed in 
our example is simpler than the movie Rebel Without A Cause, in which the players race towards a cliff and the 
winner is the player who jumps out of his car last. The pure strategy space in the movie game is continuous and 
the pay-offs are discontinuous at the cliff’s edge, which makes the game more difficult to analyse technically. 
Technical difficulties arise in some models with a continuum of actions and mixed strategies. Sometimes these 
difficulties can be avoided by clever modelling as in Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1986) version with asymmetric 
information. As strategies, they specify the length of time firms would continue to Stay (instead of Swerve) given 
their beliefs about the type of the other player, in which case there is a pure strategy equilibrium. For an analysis 
of the Chicken game in the context of evolutionary game theory, see Larry Samuelson, 1997, pp. 104-105.  
vi
  We are not referring here to the ‘indefinite detention of non citizens suspected of terrorist activities’ 
decreed by the Bush administration and practiced in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons after the attacks of 
9/11 in the midst of what it perceived to be a ‘state of exception’ (see Agamben, 2005; Szurek, 2004).   
vii
  Foucault (1975) documents the generalization of ‘prison’ as an institution all over the world since the 
eighteenth century, and underlines the relationship between politics and repressive technology.  
viii
  There are also situations in which a mixture of different modes of coordination is at work. For example, 
when in the absence of a political prison, political prisoners as well as military convicts are kept in jail with 
                                                                                                                                                        
criminals under military supervision. Dostoyevsky’s personal experience in the prison fortress at Omsk, Western 
Siberia, for a four-year term of penal servitude (1850-1854) for his part in the Petrashevist conspiracy is a good 
witness. The full horror of his experience of prison is given vivid utterance in his masterpiece, The House of the 
Dead, which is a good illustration of a mixture of different modes of coordination particularly that of destructive, 
ethical, and bureaucratic one.  
ix
  The solution of such a dynamic game of complete and perfect information is given by backward 
induction (see Kreps, 1991, pp. 77-79). At the last node, player A2 will choose a pacifist strategy even if A1 
adopts an aggressive strategy, since given the imminent date of liberation, the adoption of a strategy of 
aggression by A2 will cost him more. Hence at the next-to-last node, A1 chooses to adopt an aggressive strategy 
given that his pay-off will be more if A2 behaves pacifically, and so on till the first node. Then it can be 
‘predicted’ that A1 will begin by adopting an aggressive strategy and A2 will respond by a pacifist strategy. This 
is, of course, a pretty bad prediction given the importance of building a reputation of a ‘tough guy’ by A2. To 
rectify this bad prediction, one should introduce the belief of each player about the way the other player may 
behave with a given probability. This brings us to another type of equilibrium which Kreps (1990, pp. 536-543) 
analyses under the title of ‘Reputation redux: Incomplete information’. 
x
  North (1977) also interprets Polanyi’s ‘forms or patterns of integration’ as ‘markets and other allocation 
systems’. He suggests an explication of different ‘allocation systems’ in terms of transaction costs.  
xi
  The notion of biopiracy has been severely criticized recently as an alarmist exaggeration or a 
misguided reading of the IPR (Taubes, 1995; Zaitlen and German, 2000a,b; Chen, 2006). Obviously, this notion 
will always be controversial, since the dispute about whether someone should be called a ‘pirate’ or ‘promoter of 
science’ and ‘public good’ is really about who has the power. St. Augustine’s reflections regarding the ‘pirate 
and emperor’ are illuminating: “For elegant and excellent was the pirate’s answer to the great Macedonian 
Alexander, who had taken him: the king asking him how the durst molest the seas so, he replied with a free 
spirit, ‘How darest thou molest the whole world? But because I do what a little ship only, I am called a thief: 
thou doing it with a great navy, art called an emperor.’” (quoted in Pérotin-Dumon, 1991, p. 196). One can easily 
imagine that after ‘patenting’ the traditional knowledge of the Indian people about the Neem tree (its scientific 
name Azadirachtin Indica is derived from the Persian words Azad Darakht which means free tree), the giant 
pharmaceutical corporations accuse them later of ‘pirating’ the ‘patented’ knowledge which is basically their 
own knowledge. Of course, if science looks for ‘shared conventions’ to claim ‘neutrality’, then there will never 
be a science about piracy and a fortiori regarding biopiracy. 
xii
  Chen (2006, p. 5) who has adamantly decided “not to praise the biopiracy narrative, but to bury it” 
alludes to the Neem tree story. Astonishingly, however, he keeps silent about the fact that the patent was revoked 
since the ‘inventive step’ could not have been proved, and according to the European Patent Convention, it did 
not also meet the ‘morality’ criterion. While Chen generously recommends that ‘traditional knowledge’ should 
be kept within the ‘public domain’ (p. 24), he expresses his profound regrets about the “novel and economically 
senseless solution of proprietary status for traditional knowledge of biological properties and applications.” But 
what about an unjustified claim of ‘novelty’ for issuing a patent when there already exists ‘traditional 
knowledge’ about the so-called ‘invention’ as in the case of the Neem tree? “It may be enough simply to ensure 
that alleged facts of biopiracy do not form the basis for patents under existing intellectual property laws.” (p. 28). 
He prefers to be ‘socialist’ with regard to the utilisation of ‘traditional knowledge’ in the South, but an ardent 
partisan of ‘private property’ when it comes to patenting for the North.  
xiii
  Zaitlen and German (2000a, p. 66) contest the notion of biopiracy, since “‘life’ – such as the transgenic 
mouse, the Mo cell line, and Brazzein sweetener – are human inventions…It had to be invented before our patent 
laws would allow Harvard to patent it in the first place.” Apart from the unjustified notion of ‘patenting human 
cells’, one finds no clue whatsoever why the Hagahai blood cell or the traditional knowledge of the Indian 
people about the Neem tree should be regarded as an ‘invention’ of the US government or pharmaceutical 
corporations.  
xiv
  During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the state of no property was claimed by England over 
the ‘free international seas’ to legitimise its naval hegemony and pirating activities. Sovereignty is a territorial-
land concept which has never been applied over the seas. As Pérotin-Dumon (1991, p. 203) rightly remarks: 
“There is no authoritative definition of international piracy”. Presently, the state of no property (res nullius) is 
posited for outer space by the new “US National Space Policy” (2006) so that the monopoly of the US should be 
justified: “The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, 
or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitation on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and 
acquire data from space.”   
xv
  The French comedian Coluche used to define ‘theft’ as ‘finding something that has never been lost’. 
xvi
  Schlicht (1998, pp. 217-41, 276-77) is inspired by Polanyi’s integration forms though he employs 
‘modes of control’ as a synonymous expression to delineate different types of coordination, namely ‘exchange, 
command, and custom’ (in his terminology) within a firm or a society. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
